

TCS-2762-58

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14 February 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR: Project Director

SUBJECT : Strategic Air Command Use of TALENT Materials

1. Colonel Macia of AFCIN and Colonel Robert Smith, DI of SAC, arranged at my suggestion for me to visit SAC TALENT center on 6 and 7 February for the purpose of a better understanding of SAC's use of TALENT materials.

2. Two SAC organizational concepts are essential to appreciating the program for use of TALENT materials by SAC:

a. SAC plans call for three of its numbered Air Force Headquarters (2nd, 8th, and 15th) and one of its overseas Air Divisions (7th) to be so constituted as to be sufficient to become SAC headquarters in the event of an emergency. These Headquarters are supported by reconnaissance technical squadrons which are responsible for providing air target support to each Headquarters.

Comment: For this reason a duplicate negative is prepared at SAC Headquarters (from the duplicate positive which we provide) for each of the SAC units. TALENT reports or other materials relevant to SAC's missions are likewise placed on deposit in TALENT centers in these units.

b. Preparation of dossiers on SAC targets for delivery of atomic weapons is divided among the SAC units, the results being made available to all.

3. Preparation of the critical 100 series charts for radar recognition (a process which I viewed in some detail) is highly complicated. The existence of TALENT photography to date has had the effect of altering the priority upward and downward of SAC targets, added some,

eliminated some. Furthermore, TALENT photography has made possible significant changes in the contents of the 100 series charts. (See attached examples.) Whereas a summary of the changes in the SAC target list could be obtained (though at some trouble since this list is closely held), it is perhaps enough to say that the effect of TALENT photography on the SAC target list has been substantial. The effect on chartmaking has not only been substantial but could in a live situation be critical because of changes in certain instances at considerable variance to the past available charts.

4. It should be noted that the 100 series radar recognition charts are subject to constant revision. While they are known to be revised on the basis of many sources of intelligence, the charts do not provide to the user any reference to specific sources. These charts are issued as SECRET and are disseminated to SAC units, intelligence agencies, and to [REDACTED]. This chart production constitutes excellent sanitization. Through this means a considerable amount of information is made available to users not in the system and, in my opinion, without jeopardy to the security of the Project.

5. I visited the TALENT electronics vault where read-out of tapes is accomplished. From ten System One tapes SAC has identified 236 new installations pertinent to their Radar Order of Battle (ROB). Of these, 106 have been incorporated in their ROB compilation (SECRET) issuing them at the rate of about six to ten every time republication is accomplished so as not to attract attention. In this connection, responsibility for production of the Air Force ROB has been delegated to SAC, and the production procedures employed by SAC have been approved by the Utilization Advisory Board. The vault is to be expanded in order to provide space for additional read-out racks now on order and additional personnel so that they can keep more nearly current. A glance at the pinboard showing ROB for the USSR shows that the increment from TALENT is substantial, though I cannot give the exact percentage.

Comments on Security

6. SAC has approved TALENT billets for 492. On investigation, I find that one-fifth of these is made up of SSO couriers, commo and

administrative types. These people have only the minimum information outlined in the security briefing, copy of which is attached. They do not have access to nor are they conversant with the substantive details. SAC is vigorously pressing to insure personnel stability (i.e., reduce turnover to a minimum).

7. It is clear to me after visiting SAC that the number of billets for SAC will have to be increased if, as more material becomes available, they are going to be capable of exploiting it to accomplish their mission, which is vital.

8. I feel that SAC is faithfully following the TALENT procedures in spirit as well as in the letter and that their billets are justified.

JAMES Q. REBER
CIA TALENT Control Officer

Attachments
Charts
Security Briefing